The Regulation Crisis

Hat tip to Mark Thoma for pointing us to The Regulation Crisis by James Surowiecki.

The obvious problems of graft and the revolving door between government and industry, in other words, were really symptoms of a more fundamental pathology: regulation itself became delegitimatized… This view was exacerbated by the way regulation works… Too many regulators, for instance, are political appointees, instead of civil servants. This erodes the kind of institutional identity that helps create esprit de corps, and often leads to politics trumping policy. Congress, meanwhile, often takes a famine-or-feast attitude toward funding, allocating less money when times are good and reinflating regulatory budgets after the inevitable disaster occurs. … This … also contributes to the sense that regulation is something it’s O.K. to skimp on.

[T]he history of regulation both here and abroad suggests that how we think about regulators, and how they think of themselves, has a profound impact on the work they do. … So reforming the system isn’t about writing a host of new rules; it’s about elevating the status of regulation and regulators. More money wouldn’t hurt: as … George Stigler and Gary Becker point out, paying regulators competitive salaries … would attract talent and reduce the temptations of corruption. It would also send a message about the value of what regulators do. That’s important… If we want our regulators to do better, we have to embrace a simple idea: regulation isn’t an obstacle to thriving free markets; it’s a vital part of them.